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PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE-
HOW WILL THEY AFFECT THE TRIAL OF CASES?
CHARuES B. BLACKmAR*
A highly expert committee has worked for nearly four years on a
proposal for uniform rules of evidence to govern proceedings in
United States District Courts and certain other federal proceedings.'
Their work has been published as of March 1, 1969, which is sub-
stantially ahead of the anticipated date. The draft will be commended
to the Judicial Conference and to the Supreme Court of the United
States for consideration and probable adoption under the Court's
rule-making power.2 The draftsmen, however, present the following
caution: "The draft submitted herewith has not yet been submitted
to or considered by the Judicial Conference or the Supreme Court, and
it should be understood that the Court is in no way committed to it
and has not given it any consideration."
3
Trial lawyers as a class tend toward conservatism in their attitude
toward rule changes. They feel that they know the present rules and
standards, and they are dubious about proposals for change.4 Many will
ask, "Why do we need a code of evidence?" They will point out the
dangers and problems which are inherent in any codification. There
is danger that the active trial bar will not present its collective experi-
ence because of a coolness or indifference towards the entire project.
The law of evidence has grown up over the centuries. Rules of
evidence were traditionally established in order to keep juries from
hearing things which it was felt that they should not hear. There has
been a tendency to magnify the importance of evidentiary rules, so as
to apply the rules governing jury trials in cases tried by courts without
juries and in administrative proceedings.5 There is suspicion and mis-
*Professor of Law, St. Louis University; Special Assistant Attorney General of
Missouri. A.B. 1942, Princeton University; J.D. 1948, University of Michigan.
'Proceedings before United States Magistrates. PROPOSED RULE 1-o1. The rules
are published in pamphlet form, and are also reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 183 (1969).
Page references are to the pamphlet, hereinafter cited as PREUMINARY DRAFT.
21Ruis OF COURT Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). See Green, To What Extent May




'Suggestions may be addressed to the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence,
Supreme Court Building, Washington, D.C. 20544.
cSee generally K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 14.o1-.17 (1958).
PROPOSED RuLE 1-04(a) provides that a judge is not confined to evidence which
is admissible under traditional concepts, in ruling on preliminary questions of
19701
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trust of any principle of evidence law which does not comply with the
formalities of the rules of evidence.
Most of the law of evidence has been judge-made. There have been
occasional statutory additions, as in the case of the statutes designed
to facilitate the introduction of business records,6 but most of the
growth of the law of evidence is found in the cases. Courts have not
been unwilling to expand the law of evidence and to formulate new
standards as the occasion presents itself, but reliance on judicial deci-
sion alone is not without problems. Some courts may content them-
selves with reiteration of existing rules, so as to perpetuate or
extend undesirable restrictions. Innovative cases may be de-
cided by courts remote from the scene so that they are not readily
available to the lawyer who has need of them. Sometimes the evidence
law of a particular jurisdiction may be determined only by an appeal
and a reversal, with attendant waste of a trial. A law which depends
on the cases shows wide divergence among the several jurisdictions, and
the divergence is to some extent accentuated by the provisions of
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, calling for the
application of either federal or state law, whichever favors the recep-
tion of evidence. 7
There have also been many volumes on evidence law. Wigmore's
definitive treatment gets longer and longer, and other writers have
made great contributions to the field. Law review articles abound.8
The committee cites many of these in its annotations. One who under-
takes a study in evidence law, whether for academic or for profes-
sional reasons, is overwhelmed by the bulk of available material.
Under these circumstances the prospect of a reasonably simple and
compact handbook containing the basic rules of evidence is most
tempting. So there have been numerous proposals for codification. The
American Law Institute concluded that the law of evidence could not
be "restated" in the conventional way, and presented instead a Model
fact which must be decided in order to determine admissibility. He must, how-
ever, give effect to claims of privilege.
6E.g., FEDERAL SHOPBoOK Acr. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964).
71t is the apparent intention of the framers of the rules to propose abolition
of Rule 43(a), so that questions of admissibility of evidence in the federal courts
will be determined solely by the terms of the rules of evidence. This follows from
PRoPosED RuLE 11-01.
81n addition to those cited in the Committee's annotations see Green, Highlights
of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 GA. L. Rrv. 1 (1969); Symposium on
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 WAYNE L. RF-v. lo61 (1969). (Another
part of the discussion will appear in a later issue.) See also Proceedings of the
Judical Conference for the Second Circuit, 48 F.R.D. 39 (1969).
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Code of Evidence,9 in which the guiding spirit was Professor Edmund
M. Morgan. He was a profound student and a prolific writer, and made
great original contributions to thinking about the law of evidence.
The Model Code proposed some rather drastic changes. It was widely
used as a sourcebook but was not adopted, or substantially employed,
in any jurisdiction.
In 1953 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws came forward with proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence.10
These rules also show Morgan's influence but, in some respects they
present a retreat from the line taken in the Model Code and they
have not been essentially adopted except in Kansas, the Virgin Islands
and the Canal Zone." There is now general agreement that adoption
on a uniform basis is extremely unlikely.
The law of evidence has been codified in California 12 and New
Jersey.'3 Each of these codifications borrows from the Model Code and
from the Uniform Rules, but both introduce local variations. The sev-
eral codes differ among themselves. The federal committee gave each
of these codifications careful study, and they appear frequently in the
annotations.
In some other jurisdictions codification has been proposed without
success. The integrated Missouri Bar began work on a proposed evi-
dence code in the nineteen-forties and presented a comprehensively
annotated proposal.' 4 Lawyers still use the annotated document as a
sourcebook on evidence law, but the proposal for adoption of the Code
died and there seems to be little sentiment to revive it.
The federal proposal now under consideration came about as a
result of a study by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. In 1963
this committee approved a conclusion of a special committee, as
follows: "(1) [T]hat Rules of Evidence then being applied in the
Federal courts should be improved and (2) that Rules of Evidence,
'MODEL CODE OF EvmNcE (1942).
"°See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWs, 164-215 (1953).
uKANsAs STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to 470 (1964); C.Z. CODE §§ 2731-2996 (1963);
V.I. CODE §§ 771-956 (1957); 9A UNIFOp LAWS ANN. 589 (1965).
n-CALFORNIA EvID. CODE (Vest 1966). See Chadbourn, The Uniform Rules and
the California Law of Evidence, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1954).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (Supp. 1968). The rules of evidence were adopted
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. The numbering follows the model of the
UNmFORM Rus.
-Missouri Evid. Code (Proposed and Promulgated by the Missouri Bar, 1948).
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which should be uniform throughout the federal court system, were
both advisable and feasible .... "-15
The expert committee which produced the present document was
then appointed, and proceeded with the work which culminated in the
proposal now under consideration.
The Committee's report has extensive and valuable annotations,
within a compact space. The annotations present analysis of the exist-
ing law, copious citations to treatises, the Model Code, the Uniform
Rules, British sources, the state codifications, and significant cases.
Sometimes the views of writers who disagree are counterposed. The re-
port has enormous value as a reference book, quite aside from the
merits of the proposals. The discussion is scholarly and professorial.
The proposed rules are often more conservative than the Model
Code or the Uniform Rules. Perhaps it is felt that a proposal of this
nature has a better chance for adoption. There are, however, some
significant and substantial changes. Where existing authorities have
shown disagreement among themselves, the draftsmen of the Proposed
Rules have often made a deliberate choice.
One who is simply interested in the text of the proposals and in the
reasons assigned by the Committee has no particular need of a law
review article, in addition to those available. The Committee's report
and the annotations present ample material for thought, and one who
is curious may pursue the sources which the report cites.
I propose a different form of exposition. The committee could not,
within reasonable limitations of space, present a forecast of their pro-
posals in operation. In this article I shall try to examine a few of the
proposed changes in their application to situations which occur with
some regularity in litigation. I shall draw on some of the experiences I
have had in practice, and hope that others will do the same. Each
practicing lawyer should ask himself, "How will the adoption of the
Proposed Rules affect the actual trial of lawsuits in the federal courts?"
This article will deal for the most part with civil cases. The framers
recognize a problem in the application of the Proposed Rules to
criminal cases, because of the problem of the right of confrontation
under the sixth amendment. In some instances the Proposed Rules
have different provisions for civil and for criminal litigation. 6 A study
1 5
PRELTMINARY DRAFr, 5.
"6E.g. PROPOSED R LEs 2-o(g) (Judicial Notice); 3-oi (Presumptions in Criminal
Cases). The hearsay exception rules recognize the problem and express their prin-
ciples in terms of nonapplicability of the hearsay rule rather than in terms of ulti-
mate admissibility, thereby leaving the courts free to construe and interpret the
scope of the right of confrontation. PRoPosED RULE 8-o2.
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of the effect of the proposal on criminal trials, by one who is experi-
enced in the area, should be of great value.
Most of the cases discussed here would come into the federal courts
under the diversity jurisdiction. An entire article could be written on
the Erie-Tompkins aspects of the Proposed Rules. The draftsmen rec-
ognize, for example, that state law would have to be applied in deter-
mining the effect of "presumptions." 17 Other rules of evidence are
generally considered "procedural," so that federal law could be ap-
plied. Whenever a particular matter appears to be of vital or con-
trolling force in the disposition of litigation, however, there is a ten-
dency to hold that it is a rule of substance rather than a rule of proce-
dure. This article will simply state the problem without attempting to
resolve it.
There is another reason why the proposed rules should be of con-
cern to the lawyer who deals mostly with the trial of civil litigation in
private cases and does most of his work in the state courts. If the fed-
eral proposal is adopted, then there will be suggestions for its adoption
in the states. This was true of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and can be expected with regard to rules of evidence. The Proposed
Rules are framed on the basis of certain assumptions about the general
procedural system in which they operate. They might have quite a
different effect in a system which differs substantially from the federal.
The effort of admitting additional exceptions to the hearsay rule, for
example, might be quite different in a state which purports to follow
the "scintilla" rule in deciding whether there is a case for the jury. So
the proposal might not be capable of a complete transplant. Of this,
more later.
The discussion which follows will operate in the trial area more
than in the library. It will emphasize some situations in which one
might be able to make out a prima facie case under the proposal, when
he could not have done so under the preexisting law. Only a few situ-
ations can be covered. My hope is that others will see fit to add to these
situations-to present material which will demonstrate the actual effect
of the proposal on trials.
THE ELIINATION OF THE "VANISHING PRESUMPTION"
The term, "presumption" is a vague one. It was analyzed by Pro-
fessor James Bradley Thayer, who refined the concept of the disappear-
17PROPosED RuLE 3-2.
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ing presumption.18 By his analysis the true presumption was not evi-
dence in any sense, but merely served as a substitute for evidence. The
presumption disappeared on the introduction of evidence, and there-
after the case had to be decided solely on the evidence just as though
no presumption had ever been in the case. The concept was expressed
eloquently in an opinion of Judge Henry Lamm of the Supreme Court
of Missouri, as follows: "Presumptions ... may be looked upon as the
bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sun-
light of actual facts."' 9
Under the Thayer theory, a plaintiff might make out a prima fade
case with the assistance of a presumption, only to have his prima facie
case disappear along with the presumption on the admission of evi-
dence. An excellent illustration is found in the case of O'Brien v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,20 involving a
claim for accidental death benefits under an insurance policy. The
plaintiff's husband, the insured, had made a trip to the home of a
married woman for the ostensible purpose of delivering a car to her.
He was found shot to death in her home. The wound was patently ex-
ternal and violent. By the governing law this showing gave rise to a
presumption of accidental death within the meaning of the policy.
The defendant insurance company then presented testimony of the
customer and of her husband. He apparently had been living apart
from his wife for several days, but on the day in question he entered
their home while the salesman was there and observed the latter in the
course of an apparent assault upon his wife. He said that he was forced
to shoot the intruder in order to protect his wife. She verified his story
and said that the salesman had attacked her. The testimony of the two
witnesses was not contradicted by other witnesses, nor was it impaired
on cross-examination except for the normal confusion which a skilled
examiner might produce. The court of appeals described this testi-
mony as "substantial but not clear, positive and unequivocal." 21
The trial court held that the evidence of death as a result of crimi-
nal misconduct was sufficient to overcome the presumption of ac-
cidental death. Since there was no other evidence of accident, it di-
rected a verdict for the defendant insurance company on the ground
that the plantiff had not met the burden of proving accidental death.
1sJ. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw,
313-82 (1898).
1 'Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B. Ry., 196 Mo. 550, 571; 94 S.W. 256,
262 (1906).
"212 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954).
2Id. at 385.
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The court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari.
The plaintiff's attorney argued at all stages that his client should
be able to go to the jury on the question whether the defendant's wit-
nesses were telling the truth. Such of course is the normal assumption
in a case in which there is conflicting evidence. To those who follow
Thayer, however, the presumption is not evidence and the question
then has to be whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case on
the basis of the evidence. It makes no difference that the evidence pre-
sented to overcome the presumption might have infirmities or implau-
sible elements. Nor does it make any difference that a witness may have
strong motivation for testifying as he has (as is certainly the case when
the witness admits shooting another, or when a female witness is found
by her husband in an encounter with another man). Since there is no
evidence to contradict the testimony of these witnesses, there is no issue
as to their credibility. One who is defending of course is entitled to go
to the jury on the bare issue of the credibility of the opposing wit-
nesses, but this is not so as to the party having the burden of proof. The
court of appeals said that a "mere scintilla" of evidence would not
overcome a presumption, but that the introduction of "substantial
evidence" would do so. However analyzed, the plaintiff in the O'Brien
case had an issue to submit to the jury when he rested his case, but lost
that issue because of the defendant's evidence.
Another illustration is furnished by a Missouri case. 22 An employer
had furnished an employee an automobile for use in the business. The
employee had permission to take the automobile home with him and to
use it for his own purposes when the needs of the business did not re-
quire it. Under the applicable law, an employee driving his employer's
car was presumed to be on the employer's business.
An accident happened and the employer was sued. The plaintiff
proved the facts of the accident and the ownership of the car, and
rested. At this point he had a prima facie case both against the em-
ployer and against the employee.
The employee then took the stand and testified that he had a
mission for his employer which required him to travel north from his
home, but that he decided first to make a trip due south to pick up a
case of beer. The accident happened while he was returning home with
the case, and before he had started his northward trip for the employer.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that this testimony effectively dis-
22Brown v. Moore, 248 S.W.2d 553, 556.57, (Mo. 1952).
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sipated the presumption and that the trial court should have directed a
verdict for the employer because of a lack of evidence of agency. This
was so because there was no evidence of agency except the proof of
ownership of the car.
In this case there is probably no substantial motive for fabrica-
tion. It is theoretically possible that the employee might want to please
his employer by exonerating him from liability, but in these days of
widespread insurance coverage the motivation appears slight. By the
"vanishing presumption" theory, however, the existence of motivation
for falsifying would be immaterial.23
Legion examples could be found from jurisdictions which follow
Thayer, but they would serve no useful purpose. The examples given
above are sufficient to illustrate the point. A plaintiff may lose the op-
portunity to go to the jury because his case depends on a presumption
and the defendant introduces evidence which the court finds sufficient
to overcome the presumption.
The Proposed Rules reject Thayer's view, in favor of that espoused
by Professor Morgan and others, by means of the following provision:
"A presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more
probable than its existence."
24
There follow some rather complicated rules for the instruction of
the jury in cases in which there is no evidence to counter that which
gives rise to the presumption.25 These provide in effect that the party
in whose favor the presumption operates has the burden of proof of
the "basic fact," that is, the fact giving rise to the presumption.
Whether or not the basic fact has been established is a jury question
except in the rare situation in which the court may direct a verdict in
favor of the party having the burden of proof. The jury is to be in-
structed, however, that if it finds that the basic fact has been estab-
lished it must find the existence of the presumed fact. If the uncon-
tradicted evidence shows that the employee was driving the em-
ployer's car, and the purpose of his trip was not shown, then the jury
would be instructed to find that the employee was on the employer's
business.
2'But cf. Jack Cole Co. v. Hudson, 409 F.2d 188, 192-95 (5th Cir. 1969) holding
that something more than "substantial evidence" is necessary to dissipate a pre-
sumption of this type, and that the evidence in the particular case was not
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The framers realize that a jury in a criminal case may never be
told that it must find a particular fact, and so there is a separate rule
for presumptions in criminal cases.
26
The framers also realize that questions of presumptions and burden
of proof in diversity cases are governed by state law, so that a uniform
federal rule may not be applied.27 One might wonder, under these
circumstances, just how much effect the proposed changes would have.
Most of the cases involving the traditional presumptions are diversity
cases. Presumption cases governed by federal law are fairly unusual.
Perhaps the proposed change in the presumption rules is more impor-
tant as a standard or guide for state practice, than as a rule which will
have substantial operative effect in federal cases.
It seems clear that the O'Brien case would have been decided differ-
ently if the Proposed Rules had been in effect. If the presumption had
cast the burden of proving that the death of the insured was not ac-
cidental on the defendant, then evidence about the shooting would
simply raise a jury question. The jury would not have to believe a
witness's story about the shooting of an intruder who was molesting
his wife, even if she were to corroborate the story.
The case of the company car might be decided differently, depend-
ing on the applicable rules for direction of a verdict. In a jurisdiction
which would permit the jury to disbelieve any oral testimony, the
truth of the employee's explanation would presumably be a jury ques-
tion. The jury could find agency, and presumably could do so simply
because it felt that the employee might be lying. In a jurisdiction which
allows the court more authority in the direction of verdicts, the court
might very probably say that the bare showing of ownership is not
enough to make out a case in the face of the employee's unequivocal
testimony about his use of the car at the time of the accident.
It is evident, however, that jury issues would be made out in situa-
tions where it would not be possible under Thayer's view of presump-
2°PROPOSED RULE 3-01(b) provides that in criminal cases "[t]he judge is not
authorized to direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused." The
jury may give effect to the presumption but is not required -to do so. There seems
to be virtually complete agreement that the term "presumption" should not be
used in instructing a jury because of its lack of precision. See Mann v. United States,
319 F.2d 404, (5th Cir. 1963); W. MATHFs & E. DEvrTr, FEuERAL JuRY PRACticE AND
INSTRUCrIONS § 1o.o6 (1965, Supp. 1968).
"'See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.s. 437 (1959), with respect to the
application of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) to questions of burden
of proof.
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tion, and that the committee had the purpose of making a change
along these lines. The explanation is as follows:
The same considerations of fairness, policy, and probability
which dictate the allocation of the burden of the various ele-
ments of a case as between the prima facie case of a plaintiff and
affirmative defenses also underlie the creation of presumptions.
These considerations are not satisfied by giving a lesser effect to
presumptions.2
8
The supporting authorities are almost wholly professorial. The
framers adopt Professor Morgan's position in his long struggle to
overcome Thayer.29 The notes go on to cite several cases in which
courts and legislatures have tried to solve presumption problems by
changing the incidence of the burden of proof. These do not neces-
sarily sustain the change they propose.
There is no discussion of the basic problem, which is whether there
is injustice in taking a case from the jury simply because it depends
on a presumption which is said to have been overcome by evidence.
Does the "vanishing presumption" operate unreasonably? Should all
presumptions in civil cases be treated the same way? Is the proposed
change made in response to a demonstrated need, or is it offered simply
in the interest of symmetry?
Some presumptions are established because the party against whom
they operate is apparently better able to produce evidence. The prime
example is the presumption of agency from a showing of ownership.
The employer is assumed to know how his car is being used, while the
injured party has no means of obtaining knowledge in the area. But
when the employer makes an explanation should the jury be able to
disregard it, on the bald assumption that he is lying? There is no prob-
2PREIaMINAIRY DRAr", 43.
raThe ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 704(2), adopts the "Thayer view."
This was accomplished by a vote of 59 to 43, over the opposition of Professors
Morgan and Maguire. Rule 14 of the UNIFORM RULs OF EVIDENCE rejects Thayer's
position as to presumptions based on underlying facts having "any probative value,"
and states that if the presumption has probative value it operates to shift the
burden of proof. If the facts giving rise to the presumption have no probative
value, then on the introduction of evidence the case must be decided just as
though no presumption had ever been in the picture. The UNIFOPi RULE states,
"the presumption does not exist when evidence is introduced which would support
a finding of -the non-existence of the presumed fact .... if the facts which give
rise to the presumption have no evidentiary value. PRoposan RuLE 3-o3 goes even
further, and would have any recognized presumption operate to shift the burden
of proof. The rule seems to recognize the possibility of a directed verdict "against
the presumption," but this would apparently be possible only under the rather
rigid tests which govern the direction of a verdict in favor of the party having
the burden of proof.
[Vol. XXVII
PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
lem even under Thayer's position if the facts giving rise to the pre-
sumption have independent evidentiary value so as to support infer-
ences. In the case of the company car, however, it would seem that the
showing of ownership has no bearing at all on the use being made of
the car at the time of the accident. This is especially true of a case in
which the employee is allowed to use the car for pleasure during his
non-working hours.
Or should the court have authority to direct a verdict if the evi-
dence offered in opposition to the presumption seems very strong?
There is no agreement among the several jurisdictions in this area.
What we need, then, is a discussion of presumption cases which
have been decided over the years. Would the effect of abandoning
Thayer be to permit cases to go to juries in the face of all the sub-
stantial evidence? Or would those who have been the victims of unjust
direction of verdict now have the opportunity for their day in court?
The wisdom of the proposal should be decided on the basis of con-
siderations such as these, in preference to a decision based on academic
exchange.30
EXTENSIONS OF HEARSAY
The Approach to Hearsay
The Proposed Rules begin with the general proposition that hear-
say statements are not admissible in evidence.31 They then proceed to
set forth the presently recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, and
some additional ones, in two groups. There are 22 illustrations in Rule
8-o3(b) of utterances which are hearsay in form but which are ad-
missible, whether or not the declarant is available to testify. Rule 8-04
'*The draftsmen apparently assume that the court has power to direct a
verdict which is rather broad, at least when compared to the authority which
exists in some states. See PRoPosED RuLE 3 -o3(c)(2)(A). The Supreme Court of the
United States has not spoken in the area recently, and there seems to be some dif-
ference of opinion as to the extent of the power. The Supreme Court is of the
opinion that almost all cases arising under the FEDERAL EMPLoYERS LABiITrrY Acr
should be decided by juries, and has reversed many federal and state cases in
which the courts have taken the cases from juries. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reviewed the authorities recently in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d
365 (5th Cir. 1969). The opinion is replete with citations. The court said that
FEDERAL E PLOYERS LIABILITY ACT cases represent a separate category in which
the Supreme Court has given particular leeway to juries, and that the rule
applicable to those cases does not apply to civil cases generally. The general tenor
of the opinion is in favor of a fairly broad power of direction, when the court is
of the opinion that there is only one reasonable conclusion from the evidence.
nPROPOSED RuLE 8-0o2. Rule 503 of the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE proposed a
radical alteration in the hearsay rules, but Rule 63 of the UNIFORM RuLRs OF
EVIDENCE beat a retreat and the PRoposED RuL.zs follow the latter model.
1970]
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(b) presents five additional illustrations, in which hearsay statements
may be received if and only if the declarant is not available to testify.
By this process the draftsmen perpetuate the recognized exceptions to
the hearsay rule, enlarge some of them, and establish some new ex-
ceptions.
The proposal wisely makes no claim to set forth a complete cata-
log of all situations in which hearsay is to be admitted. The way is open
for the courts to create new exceptions if the need appears. The listed
"exceptions" are set forth as "illustrations" rather than as rules, with
the clear indication that additions may be made through the process
of judicial decision.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has already cited the
Proposed Rules in recognizing a hearsay exception which does not fit
neatly into any presently recognized compartment.32 An employee of a
newspaper was indicted on charges of income tax evasion, committed,
allegedly, in the failure to report the value of merchandise received
from his newspaper's advertisers in lieu of monetary consideration for
advertising space. He admitted receiving the merchandise but claimed
that he had done so at the request and direction of his supervisor; that
he received it for the account of the employer and not for his own
account; and that he was obliged to account to the newspaper for the
value of any of the merchandise which he retained for his own pur-
poses.
The defendant offered in evidence a stenographic transcript of an
examination of his supervisor, under oath, by revenue agents. The
supervisor was not available to testify because of illness. The tran-
scribed material tended to support the defendant's explanation of
his conduct.
The trial court rejected the evidence, apparently feeling that it did
not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay principle. The
transcript did not contain testimony reported in any proceeding, even
though it was given under oath and transcribed by a court reporter.
Nor were the statements essentially against the interest of the person
making them.
The court of appeals reversed, citing the Proposed Rules in sup-
port of its action. The need for the statement was apparent, in view
"'United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 1134 (0oth Cir. 1969), quoting PROPOSED
RuLE 8-o4. This citation indicates the strong possibility that some courts may make
use of the proposed rules in their present form, as authority on the current state
of thought on evidence law, so that some rules may be given effect prior to any
formal adoption.
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of the declarant's inability to testify. The statement dearly could not
have been admitted against the defendant because he had no chance to
cross-examine, but this could not be said of the government. The
agents could have examined the witness as fully as they cared to. The
reviewing court found, therefore, that the reasons which had justified
the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule were present in the case
before them.
The Proposed Rules extend the hearsay exceptions in several re-
spects. This is in accordance with current thinking. In evaluating the
proposal, it should be helpful to look at the newly created exceptions
in the light of actual trial situations.
Inconsistent Statements
The notes to the Proposed Rules say: "Prior inconsistent statements
traditionally have been admissible to impeach but not as substantive
evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence." 33
If a witness takes the stand, then his prior statements which are
completely or partially inconsistent with his trial testimony may be
received in evidence. The jury may take its choice as to whether to be-
lieve the witness's testimony from the stand or his prior statements. If
the witness denies making the inconsistent statement then other wit-
nesses may be called to establish what he said on a prior occasion. This
would pose a question of credibility which the jury would have com-
plete freedom to resolve.
It is suggested that the prior statement might very probably be
more accurate than the testimony from the stand because it was made
when the memory was fresher. This may be true as to minor details,
but seems highly unlikely as to flagrant inconsistencies.
The draftsmen of the rules no doubt feel as frustrated as others do
about the absurd situations in which juries are told that they may not
consider the inconsistent statements as evidence of the facts stated, but
only in judging the credibility of the witness who is claimed to have
made the inconsistent statements. The jury will believe as it chooses to
believe, without distinguishing between "substantive" and "merely
impeaching" evidence.
The problem arises, however, when the inconsistent statement
presents the only "substantive" evidence on a particular point. In a
recent criminal case, which did not reach the opinion stage in an
appellate court, the defendant was charged with assault committed
33PRELmmNARy DRAFr, 164-65.
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during the course of an attempted robbery. The robber had been shot
but not immobilized during an exchange with a police officer, and
this defendant had a gunshot wound when he was arrested approxi-
mately one-half hour after the robbery. To overcome this circumstan-
tial evidence, the defendant's brother took the stand to corroborate
the defendant's alibi, which consisted of the claim that he had been at
the brother's apartment and had been shot by the brother because of
undue attentions to the latter's wife. The brother testified that he
had shot the defendant. On cross-examination, he was asked: "Didn't
you tell the police that (the defendant) had been shot when he tried
to hold up a jewelry store?" An objection was made and overruled,
and the brother then answered, "No, I did not say that."
A police officer then took the stand and testified that he had ques-
tioned the brother, who had told him that the defendant had been shot
during the course of a robbery of a jewelry store. The judge of course
advised the jury that this testimony could be considered only for
such bearing as it might have on the credibility of the brother, and not
as any evidence whatsoever that the defendant had held up a jewelry
store. It is not realistic to expect the jury to give too much attention
to this instruction. If it believed the policeman rather than the witness,
then it would necessarily add the brother's prior inconsistent state-
ment to the sum-total of the evidence before it in considering the
defendant's guilt.
In the particular case, the problem was not a vital one because
there was other evidence placing the defendant at the scene of the
crime. Suppose, however, that there had been no other evidence placing
the defendant at the scene of the crime. Quite aside from sixth amend-
ment problems of confrontation, there is a serious question whether a
case based on so unsubstantial a showing should go to the jury. The
inconsistent statement may show that the brother is a liar, but it is
scant support for a conviction.
Let us now consider a simple slip-and-fall case, where the plaintiff's
recovery depends on his ability to show that the defendant had actual
or constructive notice of a dangerous condition in sufficient time to do
something about it. The element of notice is often the missing element
in an otherwise very substantial claim. Many a plaintiff has been
turned out of court because he was unable to prove notice, while other
plaintiffs have succeeded because of evidence of notice which, to put it
mildly, is suspect.
3 4
3I once heard a federal judge complimenting a plaintiff's attorney, during the
course of his explanation of the direction of a verdict against him, for not proving
notice. The judge said in effect that many lawyers would have "found" a witness
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Perhaps a fortunate attorney will find a witness who was in the
store approximately half an hour before the accident took place, who
noticed a grease spot at the point where the plaintiff fell, and who re-
ported this to the manager. Here is perfect proof of notice, if the
jury accepts it.
Now let us assume that the lawyer goes to trial relying on this wit-
ness's testimony, and that the witness disappoints him by saying from
the stand that he has no recollection that he ever noticed or reported
a grease spot. Under the conventional practice it would be difficult even
to confront him with his prior statement, because of the prohibition
against impeaching one's own witness.35 Even if this could be avoided
on a claim of surprise, the problems are still formidable. If the wit-
ness admits making the statement but says that his testimony is true
and the statement is not, then the statement does not represent sub-
stantive evidence. If the witness denies the statement, then the lawyer
or investigator who heard it may be called as a witness and may
testify to the statement, but solely for purposes of impeachment. If
his witness fails to confirm the statement, and no other evidence of
notice can be found, the plaintiff is probably out of court. In this
situation it matters not how the jury is instructed as to its considera-
tion of the statement. The case would not get to the jury.
Under the Proposed Rules the inconsistent statement, as estab-
lished by the testimony of the person claiming to have heard it, (or, in
rare cases, by the admission of the witness) would be admissible as sub-
stantive evidence of the facts stated. There would then be competent
evidence in the record of a grease spot which had been reported to
the manager. The notes to the Proposed Rules indicate that the ad-
mission of the statement would offer protection against witnesses who
are "visited" by investigators and persuaded to have a convenient im-
pairment of the memory. Yet there is another side of the coin. Was the
statement ever made, or is the witness who claims to have heard it the
real fabricator? May a slip-and-fall case, or any other case, be proved
simply through oral testimony of a prior statement covering an es-
sential element when the alleged declarant now disclaims the state-
ment from the stand? Is it necessary or desirable to change the pre-
sent law to admit this result?
to supply the missing element and -that he was proud of counsel who would
resist the temptation to do so.
-PRoposED RULE 6-o7 would do away with the proposition that one cannot
impeach his own witness. Strangely, however, PROPOSE R=u. 6-11(b) would limit
cross-examination to the scope of the direct and to matters of impeachment.
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The problem might be resolved if the trial judge were to have the
authority to direct a verdict, when such a statement constitutes the
only evidence in support of an essential part of the claim. This au-
thority might exist in the federal system, but it certainly would not
apply in "scintilla" states. Even in the federal practice, however, the
proposed illustration may permit a plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case when he could not have done so before. The proposal, then, might
have an effect which goes far beyond the elimination of an impracti-
cal and naive restrictive instruction.
Statements of Unavailable Witnesses
Illustration 2 in Proposed Rule 8-o 4 (b) would make the statement
of an unavailable witness admissible if it was made
• . . not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, de-
scribes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by
the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation of
pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested,
and while his recollection was clear.
The notes trace a history of jurisdictions in which such statements
are made admissible by statute. The rulemakers seek to avoid the charge
that the rule would encourage the presentation of carefully con-
trived and self-serving statements by claimants, lawyers, investigators,
or others, by excluding statements of interested parties and those ap-
parently procured by professionals. It is argued that the limitations on
admissibility will serve to prevent abuses, and that the over-all effect
of the proposal would be beneficial. Some lawyers may feel that this
rule opens the door to hearsay possibilities the likes of which have
never been seen before.
Let us again consider the slip-and-fall case. Suppose that an elderly
lady writes her daughter in another city as follows:
While I was shopping at the XYZ Store today Mrs. Lamb
who lives down the street slipped on a grease spot and fell on
the floor. I think she broke her hip. The ambulance came and
took her away. I heard the manager bawling out one of the stock
boys because he was supposed to wipe the spot up and didn't.
Honestly, people are so careless nowadays that I'm afraid to
go out.36
8One might say that this is an instance of "double hearsay." Under PROPOSED
RuLE 8-o5, however, there would be no problem since degrees of hearsay are not
recognized. The manager's statement would probably be admitted as an admission
of an agent within the scope of his authority, since it is given as a part of his
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Before a lawyer has a chance to interview or depose the old lady,
however, she dies. The Proposed Rules would admit this statement on
the ground that it was made without apparent motive or instigation
and that the circumstances give every indication of truth. Perhaps de-
tails such as the broken hip will be eliminated, but the statement
could be used to provide the essential element of notice. The framers
of the rules would say that there is no reason to deny the plaintiff
the benefit of this apparently reliable statement simply because of
technical notions of hearsay. The possibility of a plant or a forgery
would be remote. The only real problem is about how the attorney
would have the colossal luck to find the letter.
But we will not always be dealing with a letter. The mother in-
stead might have told her daughter at home that: "Mrs. Lamb fell on
a grease spot at the XYZ today. One of the clerks was supposed to wipe
it up but he didn't. The manager bawled him out, but that didn't
help Mrs. Lamb." Now the mother has died and the daughter comes
into court to testify to her mother's statement. There is a very real
possibility that the mother never did make the statement, and this
possibility must be acknowledged. The daughter, furthermore, is
practically insulated from effective cross-examination. All she has to
say is that her mother went to the store with some regularity and told
her this particular story. There are certainly possibilities for abuse.
The Proposed Rules, moreover, would permit the admission of
declarations which were not made at the time of or close to the events
which they purport to describe. The only requirement is that the
declarations be apparently unmotivated and uninspired, and when the
event described is reasonably fresh in the mind of the witness. At its
broadest, the proposal might permit the rather free introduction of
cocktail-party gossip.
Perhaps there would be some virtue in modifying this proposal so
that it would apply only to written statements. We would grant that
when hearsay exceptions are recognized, one ordinarily does not re-
strict admissibility because of problems of the credibility of the witness
whose testimony establishes the making of the statement. It is assumed
that the witness who comes to court is subject to impeachment and
cross-examination, so that his credibility may be judged in the same
way as any other witness. Yet if the witness simply repeats what he
heard someone say, there is certainly danger of abuse.
direction to the employees under him. See also Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead,
90 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1937), in which a statement of a clerk to the effect that a
vegetable had been on the floor for "a couple of hours," made shortly after the
accident, was held to have sufficient indication of spontaneity to be admissible.
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Declarations Against Interest
Illustration 4 in Rule 8-o4 (b) expands the traditional scope of
"statements" or "declarations" against interest, so as to include de-
clarations against one's penal interest. Some earlier cases had limited
the exception to declarations against proprietary interest.
It is generally assumed that a person will not make a statement
which is against his interest, unless the statement is true. This generali-
zation seems to be a reasonable one, even though some disoriented in-
dividuals might on occasion disparage their own interests. When a
party makes an admission against his interest, it is freely received in
evidence.
When the declarant is a witness but not a party, then the state-
ment may not be received if the witness himself is available. (An in-
consistent statement may of course be used for impeachment, and,
under the Proposed Rules, as substantive evidence, but that is not our
present point.) The testimony from the stand is to be preferred to
extrajudicial declarations.
When the witness is not available, however, declarations against
proprietary interest may be received. This exception has been rec-
ognized for many years. Courts have applied it guardedly, and have
excluded declarations which are against other than a proprietary in-
terest.
The Proposed Rules follow the lead of some cases. In Sutter v.
Easterly,37 a substantial judgment had been recovered in a damage
suit under suspicious circumstances. A post-trial investigation located
a witness who signed a statement saying that the accident had been
staged in its entirety and that he had been a party to the framing.
When the case seeking vacation of the judgment on grounds of extrin-
sic fraud came to trial, however, this witness promptly asserted his
rights under the fifth amendment and refused to testify. The court
held that in asserting the privilege against self-incrimination the wit-
ness had rendered himself unavailable, as that term is understood in
the law, and that his statement to the investigator therefore became
admissible as a "declaration against interest." It was against his in-
terest because of the possible penal liability. The court saw no reason
for distinguishing between the proprietary and the penal interest.
This extension seems as sound as the basic rule. If there is a guar-
antee of trustworthiness because a statement is against the interest of
a witness, then it should not matter what kind of interest is involved. It
37354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
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might be argued that a person who makes a declaration against his
penal interest is not a reliable witness because he admits to having a
penal interest; but his statement carries the means for its own im-
peachment on this ground and the jury may evaluate the character of
the declarant in deciding how to receive the statement.
Situations of the type just discussed, however, are not without the
potential for abuse. It might be comparatively easy to persuade a pro-
fessional idler to admit complicity in a nefarious scheme, to sign a
written statement, and then to "take the fifth" when called into court.
The written statement, moreover, may be almost wholly in the langu-
age chosen by the investigator. There is no requirement such as is
found in Illustration 2 of Proposed Rule 8-o4(b), so as to limit the ad-
missibility of statements to those which are not procured by profes-
sional investigators.
There is also a conceivable danger of the admission of oral state-
ments, in that the jury has to decide upon the credibility of the per-
son reporting the statement in addition to determining whether it
should believe the declaration. A witness might testify to the following
conversation:
Investigator: Now tell us what happened.
Witness: Jones got behind the car as it was backing out.
Then he let out a yell which was the signal. Four of us ran up
to him and kept everyone else away. We had already arranged
to call Doc Brown. The officer had Jones carried to Doc's office
on a stretcher.
Investigator: I've just written your story down. Would you
look it over and sign it if it looks all right to you?
Witness: I'm not signing.
Investigator: Why not, isn't it true?
Witness: It's true enough but I'm not going to sign.
Investigator: Would you read it over?
Witness: O.K.
Investigator: Now would you make marks on the statement
if you have any corrections?
Witness: No, I'm not going to write on it. It's all right as it
is.
So the statement is received in evidence, authenticated only by the
investigator's testimony. The document is entirely in his handwriting.
There is also a ready-made explanation as to why it has not been
signed.
Criminal cases might also present interesting possibilities. Suppose
that Bill Bumm is on trial (in federal court) for attempted robbery of
a national bank. Sam Shade testifies that he recently shared a jail cell
with George Gonoph, whose present whereabouts are completely un-
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known. Shade says that Gonoph said to him: "I did the Third Na-
tional job alone. Bumm didn't have anything to do with it."
Perhaps the second sentence would be excluded on motion, but
the first sentence would seem to be a declaration against interest which
could be admitted for "what it is worth."
We should not renounce a generally beneficial rule simply because
it may be abused. There should be, however, some consideration of
problems of possible abuse in deciding whether to extend present ex-
ceptions and, if extensions are made, in determining the need for ad-
ditional safeguards.
"Regularly Conducted Activity"
Illustration 6 of Proposed Rule 8-o 3 (b) covers the area which has
usually been described as the "business record" exception. From the
extensive notes it would appear that the rulemakers want to extend
the concepts of admissibility.3 8 The proposal refers to "records of con-
duct of regular activity" and would admit:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a per-
son with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted
activity, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
The notes explain that the intent is to go beyond present practice,
which seems to be concentrated on entries "in the regular course of
business." The present statement of the business record rule, it is said,
has a tendency "unduly to emphasize a requirement of routineness
The notes discuss the many cases excluding police reports of ac-
cidents on the ground that "the officer qualifies as acting in the course
but the informant does not." The new rule would produce substantial
changes, some of which may not be apparent of first blush. There is
good reason to admit the officer's recorded observations of time, place,
weather, location of cars and debris, and other matters which he him-
self observed and could testify to. (Whether to admit these portions of
the report only if the investigating officer is unavailable might be a
point for discussion.) It would also appear that the statements of wit-
nesses to police officers might be admissible if these qualify as declara-
tions against interest, or as the voluntary statements of disinterested
"See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, 185-90.
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witnesses within the meaning of Illustration 2 of Proposed Rule 8-04
(b). There is no reason to assume that the officer did not make an ac-
curate record of what he saw and heard. Under the proposal, then, the
police report might be admissible to the extent that it represents the
officer's observations, and also his recordation of statements which
would be admissible under a recognized hearsay exception.
There is, moreover, no basic distinction between the police officer
and the private investigator. The investigator has some bias, perhaps,
but this is not fatal to the case for admissibility. The investigator's
regular activity consists of the taking of statements, and, in order to
do his job, he must take accurate statements. He may suggest an an-
swer to a witness, but, having done so, must report what the witness
tells him. Illustration 2 to Proposed Rule 8-o 4 (b) recognized the
ability of a skilled investigator to put a witness's statement in his own
words, and therefore does not extend to statements to investigators.
With this qualification, the investigator's report might be admissible
on the same basis as the police report.
The investigator's situation is essentially different from that of the
engineer who is involved in an accident and is faced with the burden
of justifying his actions to his superiors.3 9 If an investigator turns
over false statements and false data to his employer then the employer
will be the one harmed.
If an investigator secures a statement which is against the interest
of the witness, and the witness is unavailable, then the statement would
meet the tests for admissibility as established by Illustration 4 to Rule
8-o4 (b). (See, for example, Sutter v. Easterly,
40 in which the witness ad-
mitted having had a part in the staging of an accident.) The investi-
gator's report of the statement would be taken as a part of his regularly
conducted activity and therefore would fall within the above-quoted
hearsay exception.
Rule 8-o5, then, comes into the picture. This rule provides that
there are no "degrees" of hearsay and that "[h]earsay included within
hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule
3it appears that the proposal would not change the result of such cases as
Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), in which
a report of an engineer about an accident was not admitted as a "business record."
The court of appeals felt that the situation was "dripping with motivations to
misrepresent," 129 F.2d at 991, and that the engineer did not engage in the report-
ing of accidents as a regular part of his business. It would be difficult to say that
the report was a "regularly conducted activity" on the part of the engineer.
'0°54 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
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It is quite possible, then, that the interviewee's statement might be
received as a declaration against interest, and that the record in the
investigator's report could be received as the report of a regularly con-
ducted activity. This would represent an extension of the past practice.
While some may fear that investigators will fill their files with spurious
statements, this hardly seems likely on a wholesale basis. If the change
is generally desirable, it should not be avoided simply because particu-
lar cases offer the possibility of chicanery.
The last sentence of the proposal indicates that there are grounds
for exclusion of a record if "the source of information or the method
or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."41
This provision is not easy to apply. It might well be used to exclude
purported records which appear on their face to be unreliable or in-
complete, or in which the testimony shows no regular or systematic pro-
cedure for preparation. When a person makes a statement against his
interest, however, the statement is presumed to be reliable, and when
an investigator makes a record of what he sees or hears it may be as-
sumed that he is doing his duty.
The preceding discussion does not exhaust the possibilities of
"regularly conducted activity," by any means. The purpose of the pro-
posal is to extend the "shopbook" rule. There are many possibilities
with regard to medical records, or records which are not kept as a part
of a "business" activity.
Recorded Recollection
The "recorded recollection" exception to the hearsay rule has
been long recognized. Illustration 5 to Proposed Rule 8-o3 (b) states
the exception somewhat more broadly than some courts have stated
it in the past. A witness may testify with respect to a memorandum
which he did not make, if it presents a record of his recollection. (Of
course the memorandum would have to be authenticated by the person
who prepared it, or would have to fall within one of the recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule such as the "business record" or, in the
language of the new proposal, the "regularly conducted activity" ex-
ception.) Nor is it necessary that the recording be contemporaneous
with the event recorded. All that is required is that the record be made
when the subject matter is fresh in the mind of the witness. The mem-
orandum may be used, however, only if the witness "has insuf-
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During the trial of a civil antitrust action in Philadelphia, involv-
ing the electrical industry, a witness who had pleaded guilty to a
price-fixing conspiracy and had been sentenced to jail took the stand.
He said that he had no recollection of some of the significant details
and that he had made a conscious effort to forget them. He was then
presented with a record of testimony he gave before a Senate Commit-
tee under the chairmanship of the late Estes Kefauver, properly au-
thenticated. The witness said that he remembered the testimony and
that he told the truth before the committee. He maintained his posi-
tion that he had no present recollection, but said that "if that's what
the record says, then it's true because I told the truth." The trial judge
then admitted the record of the Senate hearings, on the basis that it
represented a record of the witness's recollection. This was so even
though the witness did not make the record, and apparently never
saw it, and even though the testimony was given some time after the
material events took place. The ruling seems to be in accordance with
the point of view of the Proposed Rules.4
By the situation just described the witness has effectively shielded
himself from cross-examination. If he really has no memory of the
events in issue, he simply cannot elaborate. (It would be different of
course if the witness were to admit that his memory had been "re-
freshed.") The most frustrating answer to the cross-examiner is a
simple, "I don't remember." In the case just described it seems un-
likely that the lack of memory is as total as the witness would have one
believe, but this is a point which the jury would have to resolve.
A strategy of taking detailed statements from witnesses, modifying
them to suit the lawyer's purposes, and then asking the witnesses to
claim loss of memory, would probably be ineffective in the great ma-
jority of cases. The jury will probably not be impressed by a witness
who says that he has no memory at all of an event as to which he gave
a detailed statement. In other respects the relaxation of the rigidities
which some courts apply to the "past recollection" rule seems desirable.
CONCLUSIONS
We may make some generalizations on the basis of the fact situa-
tions just discussed.
(i) In numerous instances the Proposed Rules would allow the ad-
mission of evidence which would be excluded under present practice.
(2) In some of these instances, the admission of the evidence would
"See PRELmAY DRAFr, 183-84.
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take place under circumstances which would preclude cross-examina-
tion. When there is a declaration against the interest of an unavailable
witness, or an "uninspired" statement of an unavailable witness, then
the person making the statement will of course not be present in court.
When an inconsistent statement is offered as substantive evidence, the
witness obviously cannot be cross-examined about the statement if he
denies having made it, or says that he has no recollection of having
done so, or claims lack of memory of the facts in the statement. This
is also true of a statement which records past recollection. Then too
there are instances in which a statement will be presented in court
without testimony either from the declarant or from the person who
heard the declaration. One traditional objection to hearsay has been
the absence of the opportunity for cross-examination. To the extent
that exceptions are recognized, the courts hold in effect that the ad-
missibility of the evidence is important even though cross-examination
is not available. When exceptions are established in areas normally
covered by oral testimony, then the abridgement of cross-examination
may have more significance.
(3) It would be unrealistic to deny the potential for fabrication
which is present in some of the Proposed Rules. The existence of such
a possibility, of course, is not sufficient reason for the rejection of evi-
dence which should otherwise be admitted. Fabrication is somewhat
easier when one simply has to relate what another has said, and this
is especially so when the other person is dead or when his whereabouts
is unknown.
(4) If the Proposed Rules are adopted then cases will undoubtedly
be submitted to juries which would have been disposed of by directed
verdict under the earlier practice. With regard to presumptions the
draftsmen apparently intend this result. There will be other cases
in which an essential element may be established through evidence
which would not have been received under the present state of the law
in a majority of jurisdictions. I have used slip-and-fall cases as an ex-
ample. They furnish a good one because they depend on a simple ele-
ment which may be established through relatively brief oral testi-
mony. There are undoubtedly other examples.
(5) The rules necessarily provide for some distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings. The framers feel that no presumption may
be given a binding effect in a criminal case. The jury must be free to
disregard the presumption if it chooses. The admission of additional
hearsay exceptions may present a problem of "confrontation" under
the sixth amendment, in the view of the Supreme Court, whether or
[Vol. XXVII
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not the Court's position is sound on a theoretical basis.
43 It is of
course more important to have the best available rules of evidence
than to preserve the same set of rules for both civil and criminal cases.
By listing these problems I do not mean to argue against the Pro-
posed Rules, or even to suggest that substantial modifications are in
order. There are other considerations.
(1) It is not reasonable to assume that juries will simply swallow
unsubstantial and unworthy evidence, simply because it is technically
admissible. Perhaps a jury in the traditional slip-and-fall case is at-
tuned toward the plaintiff's interest and will find for him if given the
slightest opportunity to do so. In other cases, however, it should not be
lightly assumed that the jury will accept a statement that someone
else claims to have heard at some remote time, when there is a witness
on the stand who gives testimony to the contrary. And if a witness pro-
fesses lack of memory on an important detail, then a jury is likely to
suspect his recorded recollection when other witnesses testify from
present memory. A declaration or a record might be quite persuasive
when coupled with other evidence, while the jury might give it little
weight when presented alone and in the abstract.
(2) If it appears that the Proposed Rules might permit cases to go
to juries which should not be submitted, then the place for correction
is in defining the court's power to direct a verdict.44 Let us look for a
moment at the following possibilities which were considered in the
earlier discussion:
(a) An employer is sued because of the alleged negligence of his
employee. The only "evidence" of agency is the showing that the em-
ployee was driving a car owned by the employer at the time of the ac-
cident. There is uncontradicted testimony, however, showing that the
employee was on a mission of his own at the time of the accident. By the
rationale of the Proposed Rules, the defendant employer would have
the burden of showing that the employee was not on his business.
(b) The only evidence of notice in a slip-and-fall case is the testi-
mony of a witness who had not been in the store, about what that
witness heard another person say as to the manager's admission of
knowledge. Under the proposal this evidence would be admissible if
the person who claims to have seen the accident is dead or otherwise
unavailable.
When the plaintiff's case depends on evidence of such slight pro-
bative value as that indicated above, is there necessarily a case for the
'2See PRELIMINARY DRAFr, 156-59.
"See note 3o supra.
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jury, or should the court take the case from the jury and direct a
verdict?
The common law expedient was to grant a new trial if the judge is
of the opinion that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The
judge would in effect tell the plaintiff that he would have to sell his
story to another jury before he could hold a verdict. Sometimes there
was an implicit threat to order a new trial in every case in which the
particular plaintiff should succeed in getting a jury verdict. Some
jurisdictions have limited the court's power to grant a new trial on the
ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or have
limited the number of times that this power may be exercised in a
particular case.45 The granting of a new trial is not so effective as a
means of correcting unreasonable verdicts as it may have been in the
past.
This is particularly so because of the high cost of litigation and
the crowded situation of dockets. So we have the suggestion that if the
trial judge feels that he is compelled to set aside a verdict because he
feels that the verdict is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence,
he should then complete the process by directing a verdict in favor of
the opposite party.4 6 The federal courts apparently have a broader
power for direction of verdicts than do some state courts. Some of the
latter say that a case must go to the jury if supported by a scintilla of
evidence, or that a verdict may not be directed in favor of the party
having the burden of proof on the basis of oral testimony. Perhaps
there is a need for reconsideration and clarification of the situations in
which a verdict may be directed. A rule of evidence which seems to be
otherwise desirable should not be rejected or pared down simply be-
cause it might allow some possibly unmeritorious cases to go to the
jury which could not otherwise have done so. The rules of evidence
are not designed to govern the taking of the case from the jury. They
often have had the effect of determining the submissibility of a case,
but this is not a necessary result.
We need further study of fact situations which recur regularly,
from lawyers who are familiar with them. I have tried to give con-
sideration to some of these. Perhaps there are others. It may be that in
some instances the Proposed Rules are too restrictive. This should also
be discussed on the basis of experience. Maybe a degree of "tighten-
ing" in some areas will make for improvement. The present draft re-
"See, e.g., Mo. Sup. Or. R. 78.01, derived from Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.30
(1952) and providing that only one new trial may be granted to the same party
on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
"6See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); note 30 supra.
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quires that a witness's memory be impaired to some degree before a
record of his recollection can be admitted. This is decreed so that a
witness who remembers the facts cannot have his testimony prepared
for him by an interested and expert hand. A statement of an unavail-
able witness, not constituting a declaration against interest, may be
received only if the witness is disinterested and the statement is not
inspired by a professional. Perhaps other restrictions might be de-
sirable to eliminate problems with rules which are otherwise desirable.
We should remember, furthermore, that perfection is not to be ex-
pected. It is impossible to frame any rule of evidence which is not
subject to abuse or tampering. A rule should not be rejected simply
because a horrible example may be conjured; and new proposals should
not be turned down for assigned reasons which would apply as well to
the old as to the new.
Following a consideration by those who have experience in the
area it should not be difficult to reconsider the proposed draft, to make
alterations which seem desirable, and then to submit it for adoption.
It is very likely that the proposal will be adopted without major
changes. My opinion is that adoption of the study and indicated re-
vision is desirable.
